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NOTES

From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting
Finding a Balance in U.S.
CFIUS:
Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions
of Domestic Assets
ABSTRACT

Merger law in the United States has historically relied on a
system of private ordering with as little intervention from the
federal government as possible. This scheme lies in stark
contrast to the merger law of many other developed nations and,
as such, has become a trademark of U.S. corporate law. Recent
events, however, have brought into question the system's
desirability in cross-border transactions where foreign entities
are investing in U.S. assets. Proponents of reform argue that
the federal government should become more involved in the
approvalprocess for these transactionsgiven increased concerns
of national security, while opponents argue that welcoming
foreign investment is a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy not to be
changed. This Note suggests a reform addressing both of these
concerns in the hope that, when the next such transaction is
called into question by U.S. politicians, the concerned parties
will have a well-established legal ,doctrineto guide them.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On April 4, 2005, California-based oil and natural gas
powerhouse Chevron Corporation (Chevron) announced its intention
to acquire another California-based industry leader, Unocal
Corporation (Unocal).1 The deal obtained antitrust approval from the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and negotiations were proceeding
according to schedule until June 23, 2005, when China National
Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) announced an unsolicited $18.5 billion
bid for Unocal, topping Chevron's bid by $2 billion. 2 At the time of
the bid, China was experiencing an increased need for a secure
energy supply as a result of its growing economy. 3 Moreover, as a
result of China's trade surplus with the United States, foreign
investment seemed to make good economic sense as a way for the
4
Chinese to satiate this heightened need for energy supplies.

1.
Dick K. Nanto et al., China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues for
Congress (Feb. 2006), at CRS-1, available at https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/
crs/nps2l-060806-12.pdf#search=%22china%20and%20the%20cnooc% 20bid%20%22.
2.
Id.
3.
See id. at CRS-3 to -6.

4.

See Stan Crock, Keeping America Safe - From Foreign Buyouts, Bus. WK.,

Oct. 24, 2005, at 53.
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Within hours of the announcement of the bid, however,
concerned rumblings could be heard in Congress regarding national
security issues arising from the possibility of a foreign company
5
f king control of a U.S. company in the already tight energy market.
This apprehension was exacerbated by the fact that the CNOOC Ltd.
entity was a subsidiary of a large, state-owned Chinese petroleum
company, thereby adding fuel to the political fire. 6 The opposition in
Congress took the form of several bills and resolutions that were
introduced over the course of the summer. 7 The first such
Congressional missive came in the form of a House Resolution,
drafted by Representative Richard Pombo of California, voicing the
concerns that had been discussed in Congress and calling for
President Bush to conduct a thorough review of the proposed
acquisition-if indeed Unocal and CNOOC were to enter into an
agreement.8 On the same day, June 30, 2005, the House also passed
an amendment to an appropriations bill, which prohibited the use of
Treasury funds for the purpose of gaining approval for the proposed
9
transaction.
In an effort to make assurances to stockholders and to quell the
minor political uproar that followed CNOOC's bid, the directors of the
Chinese company subsequently volunteered to undergo review by the
Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS).
CFIUS is a multi-agency panel comprised of twelve members,
including representatives from the Department of Homeland Security
and the Commerce Department, which assesses a deal's viability in
terms of national security before making a recommendation to the
President."O CNOOC's June 27, 2005 letter to the U.S. Congress
aimed to "stress the key commitments that are an integral part" of
the "friendly and open offer for Unocal." 11 After establishing
CNOOC's willingness to participate in a CFIUS review, the letter
went on to assure Congress that "substantially all of the oil and gas
produced by Unocal in the U.S. will continue to be sold in the U.S.
should a merger occur" and reiterated CNOOC's commitment to
"retain[ing] the jobs of substantially all of Unocal's employees,
including those in the U.S."1i 2 Because the foundation of political

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Nanto, supra note 1, at CRS-1, -3, -14 to -15.
Id. at CRS-1.
Id. at CRS-14 to -16.
H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); Nanto, supra note 1, at CRS-

15.
9.
151 CONG. REC. 90, 5515-16, 5537-38 (2005) (amending H.R. Res. 3058,
109th Cong. (2005) by way of floor amendment).
10.
Nelson D. Schwartz, Why China Scares Big Oil, FORTUNE, July 25, 2005, at
89, 89-93.
11.
Letter from CNOOC to the U.S. Congress (June 27, 2005), available at
http://www.ft.com/home/us [hereinafter CNOOC Letter].
12.
Id.
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opposition to mergers is generally the risk of job loss, this move was
aimed directly at alleviating the fears pervading the U.S. political
13
scene.
In the meantime, Chevron sweetened its offer to $17 billion on
July 20, 2005.14 Political pressure and regulatory risk continued to
mount regarding CNOOC's offer, despite the company's assurances in
the June 27 letter to Congress that indicated CNOOC's readiness to
undergo CFIUS review. 15 At this juncture, CNOOC chief executive
Fu Chengyu began to publicly consider a pledge to sell the entirety of
Unocal's U.S. assets to assuage the political concern. 16 This proposed
restructuring of the transaction would appear to please both sidesCNOOC was primarily interested in Unocal's "extensive Asian
assets," and Congressional concern centered on the control of Unocal's
17
U.S. assets.
Days later, however, the CNOOC board determined that the
regulatory risk surrounding the proposed transaction had reached
political
and
citing
"unprecedented
insurmountable
levels,
oppression," the CNOOC board withdrew its offer for Unocal. 18
CNOOC's August 2, 2005 press release went on to assert that the
events of the summer were "regrettable and unjustified' and had
"created a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable risk" to
CNOOC's ability to secure the transaction. 19 Further, the CNOOC
board acknowledged its efforts (volunteering to undergo CFIUS
review, pondering the immediate sale of all of Unocal's U.S. assets,
etc.) to make the deal work in the face of adversity: "CNOOC has
given active consideration to further improving the terms of its offer,
and would have done so but for the political environment in the
U.S."2 0° Perhaps most significantly, CNOOC felt that it was no longer
in the "fundamental best interests" of its shareholders to continue to
21
pursue the bid.
On August 10, 2005, the Unocal shareholders voted to accept
Chevron's bid, and the transaction has since proceeded relatively
uneventfully. 22 In the aftermath, the "losers" appear to be Unocal
shareholders, who perhaps lost the opportunity for a more lucrative

See Antony Page, Editorial, Trust the Market in the Sale of Unocal,
13.
BALTIMORE SUN, June 27, 2005, at 13A.
Nanto, supra note 1, at CRS-1.
14.
15.
Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., CNOOC in Unocal Sale Pledge, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 27, 2005, at 15.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Press Release, CNOOC, Ltd., CNOOC Limited to Withdraw Unocal Bid
(Aug. 2, 2005) (on file with author).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
Nanto, supra note 1, at CRS-1.
22.
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transaction, and CNOOC, which lost the opportunity to obtain
valuable assets that it was financially capable of procuring. The
"winner" appears to have been Chevron, which, although it had to
sweeten its original offer slightly in response to CNOOC's offer,
nonetheless came away from the acquisition without having to match
or exceed the CNOOC offer. Since these events unfolded in the
summer of 2005, CNOOC itself has shown signs that it has recovered
from any ill effects the failed transaction may have caused. In fact,
on January 10, 2006, CNOOC announced a $2.27 billion purchase of a
45% stake in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field, the company's
largest acquisition to date. 23 Further, this is the company's first
acquisition outside of Asia, indicating its unyielding desire to expand,
regardless of whether or not U.S. merger law allows it to do so on
U.S. soil. 24 This relentless movement to expand abroad has been
termed by the Chinese as their "go out strategy," and as CNOOC's
determination to grow abroad demonstrates, this policy is
unquestionably established and quickly becoming a reality of Chinese
25
diplomacy.
Though this scenario-a foreign company seeking to gain assets
in a U.S. entity-is hardly a new one, the failed Unocal/CNOOC
transaction is eyebrow-raising for a variety of reasons. First, the
stakes of the transaction were certainly high, with Unocal finally
being sold to Chevron for over $17 billion. 26 Moreover, the fact that
the transaction was in an increasingly crucial sector of the market is
undoubtedly noteworthy. The impact of this failed transaction on
U.S-Sino relations is yet to be seen, but as China's economic prowess
continues to grow, it is clear that diplomacy in this regard has
benefits.27 In fact, there appear to be many players potentially
interested in U.S. energy properties, as both state-owned and
privately owned companies in Russia, France, Venezuela, and Saudi
Arabia have all been purchasers of U.S. energy interests in recent
years. 28 Also, China-based Lenovo Group Ltd. acquired IBM's PC
division in early 2005, and China's largest home-appliance maker,
Haier Group Co., was in the midst of a bidding war for U.S.-based

23.
Kate Linebaugh & Shai Oster, CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion for Nigerian Oil,
Gas Stake, WALL ST. J. (H.K.), Jan. 10, 2006, at 1.
24.
See id.
25.
See Peter S. Goodman & Ben White, Haier Withdraws Maytag Bid: Move is
a Sign of Caution in China's Pursuit of ForeignFilms, WASH. POST, July 20, 2005, at

D02.
26.
ABSTRACTS,

See Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES
Aug. 3, 2005, 2005 WLNR 12231596, at Al.

27.

See James A. Dorn, U.S.-China Relations After CNOOC, 55 FREEMAN 10,

Dec. 2005, at 30, 30-32.
28.
Page, supra note 13, at 13A.
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Maytag Corp. until it dropped out during the summer of 2005.29
Even more recently, Congressman Ralph Hall, a Republican from
New York, expressed concern in Congress over the proposed sale of
U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company, whose potential buyers
included a Japanese company.30 Though the level of Congressional
opposition thus far has paled in comparison to that incited by the
UnocaIICNOOC proposed transaction, the nuclear energy sector
raises many of the same national security concerns that would result
3
in calls for a revamping of the merger process in the United States. '
Most recently, in a news item that has dominated the headlines,
perhaps even more so than the CNOOC affair, the Bush
administration-somewhat surprisingly given its attitude towards
the CNOOC/Unocal proposed transaction-approved a business deal
involving the sale of six major U.S. ports to Dubai Ports World, a
company substantially owned by the United Arab Emirates. 3 2 After
CFIUS found no reason not to go forward with the proposed
transaction and President Bush approved it, the U.S. Congress
expressed serious concerns regarding the transaction, primarily for
reasons of national security.3 3 In fact, the shareholders of Peninsular
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), the UK-based
holding company currently in possession of the ports in question,
went so far as to vote on and approve the transaction.3 4 To the extent
that the uproar over CFIUS reform had subsided since it was on the
forefront of Congress's agenda last summer, this deal has promptly
35
and forcefully thrown the issue of CFIUS reform back on the table.
Furthermore, as this situation unfolds, perhaps its most noteworthy
aspects are the fundamental disagreement between the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government and the legislative
branch's vulnerability in the currently existing CFIUS review
process. 36 Again, there are tensions between the U.S. need for foreign
investment, given a trade deficit that amounted to hundreds of
billions of dollars last year, and the need for increased national
security, with particular attention paid to emerging markets such as

29.
Pavel Molchanov, U.S. Revives Japan Inc. Fears Over China's Buying
Spree: Americans Are Uncomfortable About Just How Powerful China is Becoming,
NAT'L Bus. REV., Aug. 12, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13373895.
30.
Carola Hoyos & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Concern Over Likely Sale of
Westinghouse Nuclear Power, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 13, 2005, at 22.
31.
Id.
32.
Greg Hitt, Lawmakers Push for New Review Of Port Deal Amid Security
Fears, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2006, at A4.
33.
Dennis K. Berman et al., Bush, Congress Head For Clash Over Ports Deal,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2006, at Al.
34.
Andreas Paleit, How the DP World Deal Unraveled, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 11, 2006, at 8.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
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the United Arab Emirates. 3 7 This scenario stands as further proof
that CNOOC was certainly not the last foreign corporation to seek
U.S. assets in an economically and politically crucial industry
38
sector.
In a development similar to what occurred in the CNOOC/Unocal
transaction just a few months prior, on March 9, 2006, Dubai Ports
World bowed to "extreme public and political pressure" and gave up
its management stake in the U.S. seaports. 3 9 Thus, the management
of Dubai Ports World made a decision like that made by CNOOC
management that the backlash that had arisen was too strong to
overcome. 40 This situation gave renewed relevance to the CFIUS
question and resulted in numerous pledges to reform the takeover
41
review process in the United States.
It is clear that this is an issue that will not subside, but rather
will swell in the coming years, as the effects of globalization continue
to spread and cause an increasing number of economies around the
world to seek overseas expansion in a variety of vital industry
sectors. 4 2 Regarding China in particular, the comments of William
Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council and a
member of the congressionally appointed China Economic Security
and Review Commission, will likely prove prescient: "China is piling
up dollars, it's only a matter of time before they start going into the
'43
acquisition of U.S. companies. People shouldn't be surprised.
This Note ultimately aims to suggest a solution for like
scenarios, which will inevitably arise in the near economic future,
given that heavy-growth economies, such as those in China, India,
and the United Arab Emirates, will have both the resources and the
need to expand beyond their borders. Accordingly, Part II of this
Note examines the process of completing a merger pursuant to the
current body of U.S. corporate law and compares this statutory
framework to that which presently exists in several foreign
jurisdictions. Part III examines the role of CFIUS and the recent
movement to expand the scope of this agency, thereby proposing

37.
Needs And
38.
39.

Michael M. Phillips et al., Port Debate Exposes Conflicts Between Security
Foreign Investment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
Id.
Gwyneth K. Shaw & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Dubai Firm to Shed Stake in

U.S. Ports, BALTIMORE. Sun, Mar. 10, 2006, at 1A.
40.
Id.

41.

Edward Alden & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, The Americas: Pledge to Reform

Takeover Vetting, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2006, at 8.
42.
See Harry L. Clark & Sanchitha Jayaram, Intensified Trade and Security
Policies Can Present Challengesfor Corporate Transactions,38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391,

391-95 (2005) (presenting a fairly exhaustive listing of cross-border transactions
involving U.S. targets which have been subject to enhanced scrutiny in recent years).
43.

Martin Vaughan, Observers Brace For Foreign Acquisitions of Key Firms,

CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 10, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2417020.

1310

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:1303

dramatic changes to the U.S. merger statutory framework described
in Part II. Lastly, Part IV offers a solution to this scenario, with the
hope that its implementation will allow for a smoother, less
controversial process when the next foreign entity attempts to acquire
a U.S. conglomerate.

II. COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS TRANSACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A. Statutory Framework of Delaware General CorporateLaw
ConcerningMergers
Corporate law in the United States is based primarily on state
law regimes, with Delaware leading the way; more than half of the
largest corporations in the United States, including Unocal
Corporation, are incorporated in Delaware. 44 Since other states have
generally followed Delaware's lead on many fundamentals of
corporate law, including merger law, it is sensible to examine the
relevant Delaware statutory language as a means of extrapolating
the overriding norms of U.S. merger law. 4 5 Of course, this statutory
structure only applies to entities incorporated under the laws of
Delaware, which may not be the case in cross-border transactions.
However, using the Delaware statute as a base nonetheless is
insightful because it reflects the fundamental principles of U.S.
merger law.
Delaware General Corporate Law § 251 sets forth the
requirements for corporations incorporated in Delaware to enact a
merger. 46 The statute first requires that the corporations adopt "an
agreement of merger or consolidation. '47 Section 251(b) sets forth the
various provisions that must appear in this merger agreement and
further specifies that it is the directors of the involved corporations
who are responsible for approving the agreement and "declaring its
advisability. '48 The statute also requires that any agreement adopted
pursuant to § 251(b) be submitted to the "stockholders of each
constituent corporation at an annual or special meeting for the
purpose of acting on the agreement." 49 The remainder of this

44.
CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 141 (2003); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to

CorporateGovernance Reform: Why Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1097 (2004).
45.
See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 141.
46.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2005).
47.
Id. § 251(b).

48.

Id.

49.

Id. § 251(c).
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provision delineates certain exceptions to the stockholder vote
requirement, including the de minimis change exception and the
short-form merger exception, but does not impose any additional
50
requirements on the parties seeking to effect a merger.
Notably absent from the basic statutory corporate law governing
mergers in Delaware is any requirement of government approval of a
particular merger agreement. Indeed, in the cross-border merger
context, there is a "general absence of government regulation of
foreign investment ... and exchange controls in the United States."51
By simply adhering to the requirements of § 251, the parties can
complete a merger without government involvement, while fulfilling
all requirements of state corporate law.5 2 Unlike the regimes in place
in many other nations, the United States "exercises few controls over
foreign exchange transactions by U.S. citizens or foreign exchange
transactions," as "no approval of the Treasury Department or other
finance authorities is required to make an investment. ' 53 In fact,
foreign exchange transactions of substantial size are monitored by
54
the U.S. government only for informational purposes.
There are, however, several instances in which the federal
government does become involved in the merger process in the United
States. The most significant occasion for government involvement in
the merger process arises in the antitrust arena.5 5 Title II of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act delineates the
premerger notification process that is necessary under federal law to
effect a merger. 56 Likewise, federal law becomes involved when the
state statutory structure is combined with the mandatory disclosure
regime of federal securities laws, a combination which reflects the
"market-based corporate governance system of the United States. '5 7
Both of these instances in which federal law-and hence the federal
government-becomes involved in the merger process, however, exist
outside of the corporate law with which this Note is concerned. The
last (and at present, least significant) instance in which federal law
becomes intertwined with state corporate law arises in the context of
cross-border transactions and is described in further detail in
subsequent parts of this Note.
In U.S. corporate law there exists an inherent trust of private
ordering, which in turn leads to a trust of the markets at large to

50.

Id. § 251(d)-(g).

51.
DAVID J. BENDANIEL & ARTHUR H. ROSENBLOOM, THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 26 (1990).
52.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2005).
53.
BENDANIEL & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 51, at 27.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
54 AM. JR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 310 (2005).
Id.
Paredes, supra note 44, at 1097.
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ensure equitable transactions in this area of the law. 58 Moreover,
private ordering increases efficiency, in that corporate mergers are
often time-sensitive and government involvement would inevitably
cause delay. 59 It is sensible that these efficiency-diminishing
governmental constraints would not exist, considering that Delaware
courts "frequently note that mergers

.

.

.

are 'encouraged and

favored."' 60 There appears to be a general consensus that private
ordering is more efficient than government regulation. This provides
a compelling reason to preserve at least a vestige of this trademark of
U.S. corporate law which, as is demonstrated in the following section,
is not necessarily a feature of many foreign corporate governance
61
systems.
B. Statutory Framework of Foreign Law ConcerningMergers
In comparing foreign statutory frameworks to the Delaware
formulation generally followed in the United States, the presence of a
government entity responsible for enforcing all aspects of takeover
law is the most readily visible difference. 62 Though the United States
has such entities in the securities and antitrust areas (the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission,
respectively) there is no entity charged with enforcing other mergers
63
in the United States.
The United Kingdom has established a Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers, which acts pursuant to the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers.6 4 "Public companies adhere to the Code and the rulings by
the Panel are respected. ' 65 Germany and Austria, other EU economic
powers, have developed a similar system of takeover regulation,
whereby entities exist both in and out of the government to ensure
that companies are complying with statutory laws and more
significantly, that those companies meet investment approval
standards. 66 Likewise, in France, the acquisition of more than 20% of
a particular company requires prior authorization from the Treasury

See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 146.
59.
Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 75-76 (1996).
58.

60.

2

RODMAN

WARD

JR.

ET

AL,

FOLD

ON

THE

DELAWARE

GENERAL

CORPORATION LAW 39 (4th ed.2001).
61.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029, 2079 (2005).
62.

CHRISTIN M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 118-37 (2002).
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 118.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 124, 132.
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Department of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance. 67
Similarly, China's takeover law, though still in an early stage of
development, appears to be moving in the same direction, with a
great deal of involvement on the part of the state.6 8 However, it is
worth noting that because China's law and policy on this issue are
still in a somewhat formative stage, there is a well-placed concern
that U.S. policy could "prevent China from following the free-market
way."69
With an eye towards foreign investment in domestic companies,
where no mandatory process is in place in the Delaware General
Corporation Law or the U.S. law in general, "many countries restrict
foreign ownership of commercial ventures. '70 This list includes India
and numerous countries throughout Latin America, the Middle East,
and Asia. 71 This type of protectionism, which is apparently prevalent
in many other foreign statutory constructions, is non-existent in the
United States at the present.
In Japan, though foreign takeovers and mergers are relatively
rare, a nonresident tender offeror must file its offer with the
securities company or bank it has appointed to manage the
transaction. 72 Moreover, the Foreign Investment and Trade Control
Law (FITCL) requires notice to be given to the Minister of Finance
when a foreign corporation is attempting to transact with a Japanese
corporation. 7 3 At this point, the Minister of Finance may require a
license for the transaction "if the transaction might disturb the
equilibrium of Japan's balance of international payments; might
result in a drastic fluctuation of Japanese foreign exchange rates; or
might result in transfers of funds between Japan and foreign
countries in a large volume, thereby adversely affecting the Japanese
money or capital market. ' 74 Further, the Minister may refer the
matter to the Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other
Transactions for recommendations on various matters, including
whether the transaction "could imperil the national security of
Japan." 75 Thus, there is a decided concern for the protection of
Japanese assets evident in Japanese merger law. Although this has
relaxed in recent years given the effects of globalization, it is

67.

BENDANIEL & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 51, at 64.

68.

Hui Huang, China's Takeover Law: A ComparativeAnalysis and Proposals

for Reform, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 147-57 (2005).

69.

Page, supranote 13, at 13A.

70.
71.
72.

BENDANIEL & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 51, at 65.
Id.
H. LEIGH FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 16

(1986).
73.

Id. at 17.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

1314

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.1303

nonetheless rare for parties entering a merger to be able to "contract
'76
freely, without government influence or guidance.
Similarly, the Reserve Bank of India, which also falls under the
Ministry of Finance, is the central administrative agency charged
with regulating foreign investment in India. 7 7 The Industrial Policy
Statement of 1977 lays out the terms under which foreign investment
and acquisition of technology are allowed, stating that such
transactions will only be permitted when they are deemed to be "in
the national interest. 7 8 The document goes on to state that "majority
interest in the ownership of companies, and effective control of
companies, should be in the hands of Indian nations. ' 79 In addition,
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act regulates foreign financial
participation in Indian business, stating that all proposals must be
cleared by the Foreign Investment Board of the Indian government
and delineating an elaborate process for approval of a merger
proposal. 80 The regulatory infrastructure in place, even in a
developing economy like India's, is far more elaborate and demanding
than that which is found in U.S. corporate law.
It is evident that there are more, and better developed, statutory
restrictions on foreign investment in place in foreign jurisdictions
than in the United States. Indeed, economists, politicians, and
lawyers would likely agree that the open investment policy of the
United States has been one of the hallmarks of U.S. diplomatic
posturing throughout its history. The ability of this open investment
policy to coexist with a new infrastructure for vetting foreign
investment in the United States. is uncertain-both in terms of its
feasibility and its desirability. As the following section of this Note
will demonstrate, however, there is, in fact, a mechanism within the
mire known as "alphabet soup" in Washington, D.C., that at least
ostensibly was designed to perform a function similar to that of the
various panels and agencies existing in the European and Asian
countries described above: the Committee for Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS).8 1 Its power and role in cross-border
transactions involving U.S. entities has, however, been almost
negligible up to this point.82 Whether this will continue to hold true
given new found national security concerns in the United States is a

76.
Id. at 18.
77.
Id. at 223.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 224.
81.
See James Rosen, The Little Agency that Created a Great Big Stink,
CAPITOL HILL BLUE, Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.capitolhillblue.com/content/2006/02/the_
little-agency-that _created.html.
82.
Id.
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question that will be answered only in the context of future situations
that mirror the proposed Unocal/CNOOC transaction.

III. CFIUS

EXPANSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DIRECTORS AND
SHAREHOLDERS OF U.S. CORPORATIONS

A. What is CFIUS? A Brief History and Examinationof the
Mechanics Behind the CFIUS Review Process
The naissance of CFIUS came with Former President Ford's
passing of Executive Order 11858 in 1975.8 3 President Ford created
CFIUS and charged it with "continuing responsibility within the
Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in
the United States, both direct and portfolio, and for coordinating the
implementation of United States policy in such investment. '8 4 The
original motivation for this Executive Order and the ensuing birth of
CFIUS was likely the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which left several oil-producing nations
with surplus cash that they could potentially use to purchase U.S.
85
assets.
Allowing such acquisitions to go forward without government
monitoring has raised concerns within the Executive Branch of the
U.S. government in the past. One of the most prominent such
instances, mentioned by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission (USCC) member Patrick Mulloy in his congressional
testimony regarding CFIUS, was the post-OPEC proposed
transaction between Kuwait Petroleum Company and Santa Fe
International Company, a U.S. entity. 86 The Executive Branch
objected to the transaction, but was essentially helpless to do
anything about it because of the liberal U.S. statutory framework
regarding merger activity.8 7 The transaction had to be stalled on
antitrust grounds, the only way in which the government could
reasonably get involved, until a merger agreement more suitable to
88
the Executive Branch was reached.
This helplessness of the Executive Branch in the face of an
undesirable merger was brought to an end with the passage of the

83.
Foreign Investment on U.S.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct. 20, 2005) (statement of Patrick A. Mulloy, Member,
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commision), available at 2005 WLNR
16994551.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
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Exon-Florio Amendments in 1988.89 This legislation empowered the
President to "investigate and, if necessary, block foreign takeovers of
American businesses on national security grounds." 90 Though the
Exon-Florio Amendments acknowledge the open investment policy of
the United States, they nonetheless authorize the President to
"suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of
U.S. companies if a foreign controlling interest might take action that
threatens national security." 91
In 1975, the President delegated the investigative authority he
92
was given via the Exon-Florio Amendments to CFIUS.
Exon-Florio establishes a four-step process for examining a foreign
acquisition of a U.S. company: (1) voluntary notice by the companies, (2)
a 30-day review to identify whether there are any national security
concerns, (3) a 45-day investigation to determine whether those
concerns require a recommendation to the President for possible action,
and (4) a Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the
93
acquisition.

Because notification is completely voluntary, parties who are certain
that their transaction does not implicate national security issues can
elect not to notify CFIUS, but with full understanding that a failure
to do so leaves their transaction "subject to Presidential action
indefinitely.

' 94

In terms of precisely what CFIUS is supposed to address in its
inquiry, the statute provides some guidance, but seems to allow for
differing interpretations:
For the purposes of this section, the President or the President's
designee may, taking into account the requirements of national
security, consider among other factors (1)
domestic production
requirements,

needed

for projected national defense

(2)
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet
national defense requirements, including the availability of human
resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies or
services,

89.
Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security: A
Look at the Government's Power to Say "No",77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20 (2005).
90.
Id.
91.
U.S.
GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
ENHANCEMENTS
TO
THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S EFFECTIVENESS 1

(Sept. 2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
94.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DEPUTY SECRETARY ROBERT M. KIMMiTT
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING,

AND URBAN AFFAIRS (Oct. 20, 2005), available at 2005 WL 2673050 [hereinafter
KIMMITT TESTIMONY].
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(3)
the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by
foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security...
(5)
the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on
United States international technological leadership in areas affecting
95
United States nationalsecurity.

The third clause of this provision seems to be especially susceptible to
multiple interpretations. 9 6 In any case, with or without concrete
guidelines, CFIUS is to complete its inquiry and deliver a report to
the President upon completion of its investigation, which begins the
97
next step in the process, Presidential review.
The President is given fifteen days in which to conduct his
review and decide whether it is necessary to prohibit the transaction
or appropriate to allow the transaction to go forward. 9
If the
President finds that "(1) there is credible evidence ... to believe that
a foreign controlling interest might take action that threatens to
impair national security and (2) laws other than Exon-Florio and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act are inadequate or
inappropriate to protect national security," a Presidential prohibition
may be appropriate. 99 The President's authority to prohibit a
transaction cannot be exercised, however, if "(1) the Committee has
informed the companies in writing that their acquisition was not
subject to Exon-Florio or had previously decided to forego
investigation, or (2) the President has previously decided not to act on
that specific acquisition under Exon-Florio." 100 The President has
prohibited only one transaction from going forward, when Former
President George H.W. Bush determined that a Chinese aerospace
company should not be allowed to invest and gain part ownership in a
U.S. aircraft parts manufacturer in 1 9 9 0 . 11 Thus, this provision for
Presidential review has been, like much of CFIUS, more of a
formality than an actual bar to cross-border transactions.
It is worth noting that the Exon-Florio Amendments do not
explicitly define "national security," thereby evincing perhaps one of
the most problematic features of the legislation, which will be dealt
with later in this Note. 0 2 The only guidelines provided indicate that

95.
50 U.S.C.S. app § 2170(d) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added).
96.
See Sabino, supra note 89, at 22 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 100-576 at 926
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1959 (stating that legislative history
declares "[tihe term 'national security' is intended to be interpreted broadly without
limitation to particular industries")).
97.
Id.
98.
GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 9.
99.
Id. at 9-10.

100.

Id. at 10.

101.
Id.
102.
Eric Simonson, Specialized Areas of Concern in Acquisition Transactions, in
A GUIDE TO MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 243, 262 (2006).
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"companies providing technology to the military or to the defense
industrial base may implicate national security concerns" and that
"acquisitions of businesses in industries having 'no special relation to
national security' would not ordinarily give rise to national security
concerns." 10 3 The regulations go on to cite various examples of items
that would not give rise to national security concerns (i.e., toys,
games, hotels, food products, legal services, etc.) and also to state that
certain transactions, including "purchases solely for purposes of
investment by investors acting in the ordinary course of business and
amounting to 10% or less of the stock of an entity," are exempted
10 4
from CFIUS review.
A few procedural aspects of the current CFIUS review process
are also worth highlighting because of their relevance to the changes
proposed in this Note. Section 721(a) of the Exon-Florio Amendments
permits any transaction within the ambit of the Amendments to be
subject to investigation that must commence within thirty days after
notice of the transaction has been made.10 5 This notice provision does
not require that the parties provide notice of the transaction, and
historically many parties have chosen not to do so. By failing to do
so, however, the parties implicitly allow CFIUS to commence an
investigation at any time.10 6 Technically, CFIUS also has the power
to begin an investigation and seek divestiture of a transaction after
the acquisition has closed and to unilaterally decide to review a
particular transaction after providing the parties with written
notice. 107
Interestingly,
"[clompetitors,
shareholders
and
governmental agencies" have no authority to trigger CFIUS review,
though they can contact CFIUS to raise questions or express concern
about a transaction.1 0 8 Although they have rarely come into play in
the past, these procedural provisions do provide the basis for some
significant opportunities for reform.
The Exon-Florio Amendments also state that if there are
national security concerns-however that term may be construedthen the Chief Executive is required to make specific findings that
"there is credible evidence . . . to believe that the foreign interest

exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the
national security," and that other legal avenues do not provide
''adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect the
national security" with respect to the proposed transaction. 109 The
statute also explicitly states that the President's findings are not

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id.

109.
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subject to judicial review, indicating the tremendous amount of
deference given to the President in evaluating the results of the
CFIUS investigation. 110 In short, the President "enjoys the power to
That is not to
completely prohibit a contemplated transaction." '
say, however, that there are no checks on the President's power in
this regard. The statute requires him to provide a written report of
a "detailed explanation" of his findings
his determination, including
112
and the factors considered.
Responding to concerns about the "lack of transparency" in the
CFIUS review process, Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to the
Exon-Florio Amendments in 1992.113 This provision requires the
President to deliver a report to Congress if the President makes any
decision regarding a proposed foreign acquisition. 114 Further, it
makes clear that an investigation is required in cases where "the
acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government;
and the acquisition could result in control of a person engaged in
interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the national security
of the U.S." 115 Until the past year, this marks the only concerted
attempt to reform the CFIUS process, and the Byrd Amendment did
not address the most problematic aspects of the regulations in
question.
Though the inner workings of CFIUS have remained out of the
spotlight for nearly its entire existence, it has recently been thrust
into the spotlight as efforts to expand its power have arisen in the
wake of the failed Unocal/CNOOC transaction. 116 Part of the secrecy
is intentional, of course, because the "highly sensitive nature of the
national security issues with which the Committee grapples"
demands a certain degree of secrecy. 117 But part of the secrecy is also
simply a function of the fact that the CFIUS process has not been
extensively used-at least not to the fullest of its potential-so there
has not been sufficient opportunity or occasion to illuminate many of
the subtleties of the legislation. 1 18 Regardless, the fog surrounding
the CFIUS process will likely be lifted in the near future, given the
determination with which some members of Congress are pushing for
an enhancement in the wake of the Unocal/CNOOC and Dubai Ports
World confusion. When that fog is lifted, it is likely that Washington
policymakers on both sides of the matter will take issue with the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

§ 2170(e).
Sabino, supra note 89, at 22.
§ 2170(g).
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CFIUS process, and changes will inevitably be proposed-not only by
those in favor of expanding the scope of CFIUS, but also by those
simply hoping the agency will be in a position to make efficient and
equitable decisions as it is used with increasing frequency in the
future. 119
Before addressing proposed changes to the CFIUS process and
the reasons behind them, it should be stressed that there are positive
120
aspects to the way in which the current CFIUS process operates.
The "highly sensitive" nature of these matters requires secrecy, and
the CFIUS process addresses this concern by vesting a great deal of
power in the Executive Branch of government. 121 This results in
"minimized risk of disclosure" which is, in turn, of great value to
parties engaging in these types of transactions. 122 Further, the
Committee consists largely of Presidential appointees, and as such,
its composition changes from administration to administration, as the
"prevailing winds of politics, diplomacy, and policy, both foreign and
domestic" change as well. 123 However, the CFIUS review process as
it currently stands is also sufficiently protected from fleeting political
movements because it intentionally lies out of the reach of
124
Congress.
B. The Recent Movement for Expansion of the Scope of CFIUSPower
If CFIUS is amended, the face of U.S. corporate law could
undergo a dramatic transformation that would presumably come into
play quite frequently given the increasing number of cross-border
transactions involving U.S. corporations in recent years. 125 The
"protectionist howls" heard in Washington following the narrowlyaverted CFIUS review of CNOOC's proposal have been followed by
proposals to revamp CFIUS, thereby altering the Delaware statutory
structure, so that it is more powerful and better equipped to handle
the next foreign player to make a bid for a domestic company in a
vital sector. 126 This movement has been countered by a faction
arguing that foreign trade provides an "immeasurable boost to U.S.
127
economic prosperity."'
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The members of Congress who spearheaded the movement to
prevent the proposed Unocal/CNOOC transaction now argue that the
process is nothing more than a "doormat operation" that is in need of
c .pansion. 128 Indeed, out of the more than 1,500 transactions CFIUS
ias reviewed since its inception, it has only blocked one. 1 29 The
process itself remains "excessively murky," and thus, the "extent to
which changes are warranted ... is unclear."'130 As previously stated
in this Note, the only transaction ever prevented at the stage which
CFIUS review reaches the Executive Branch occurred when
President George H.W. Bush did not allow a Chinese aviation
company (which was state-owned, much like CNOOC) from acquiring
a domestic maker of parts used in Boeing aircraft. 131 However, in two
of the largest cross-border transactions in recent history, British
Petroleum's acquisition of Amoco and Daimler's purchase of Chrysler,
both of which occurred in 1998, there was little opposition within the
ranks of the U.S. government.' 32 Whether the lack of opposition to
these large-scale transactions was due to the industries in which they
occurred or to the fact that the two foreign acquirers were
headquartered in countries that are U.S. allies, or perhaps both, is
Nonetheless, this demonstrates the remarkable
unclear. 133
inconsistency that has plagued CFIUS and adds to the confusion
134
concerning its present role.
To shed some light on the rather secretive process, a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report was issued on September 28,
2005, at the request of concerned congressmen, which assessed the
operation of CFIUS. The report suggested, among other things, an
expansion of the window of time the agency is given to analyze deals
raising national security concerns. 135 Further, the members of
Congress who backed the GAO investigation are pushing for an
expanded scope of review to cover national security issues that may
136
not be readily apparent, such as in the Unocal/CNOOC situation.
The GAO report concluded that "increased insight and oversight
could strengthen the law's effectiveness.' 37 The report did, however,
express some limits to its findings. For instance, it stated that
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CFIUS should probably not initiate these investigations because that
would result in discouragement of foreign investment, which it
138
acknowledges as undesirable.
The GAO report spurred a series of Congressional hearings in
September and October of 2005 to discuss the alleged problems with
CFIUS. 139 The legislative proposals to strengthen the Exon-Florio
Amendments now under consideration include the following:
providing Congress with veto power regarding CFIUS's clearance of a
deal; broadening the definition of "national security" to include
critical infrastructure, economic security, and energy needs; requiring
CFIUS to report to Congress on each deal for which notification is
provided; mandating more time for CFIUS review; ranking U.S.
companies based on perceived importance to national security; and
reassigning the Chair of CFIUS to a more "security-minded"
140
department of the federal government infrastructure.
Opponents of these changes would likely argue that they would
increase the amount of time spent on a number of routine cases and
detract from the controversial proposed transactions, such as UnocalCNOOC. 14 1 Moreover, opponents of change to CFIUS contend that
prolonging the review process would be economically harmful because
it would delay transactions where time is of the essence. 142 Indeed, it
seems clear that if these proposals to expand CFIUS were passed into
law, the due diligence landscape for foreign acquisitions would
change considerably, "adding regulatory delay and political risk and
diminishing the accessibility of the United States to foreign direct
investment." 14 3 Many express the sentiment that engaging Congress
in CFIUS reviews will, in the words of U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission (USCC) member Stephen Bryen, "so
confound the process that foreign investment in the United States
will be chilled."'1 4 4 Underlying all of these concerns is the notion that
"a strong economy is part of national security," and that "openness to
global trade in goods, services and capital" has historically been a
145
"key ingredient" in the success of U.S. capital markets.
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MAKER'S J., Jan. 1, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 105447.
140.
Id.
141.

See GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 15.

Ron Orol, Senate Panel Slams CFIUS, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 7, 2005, available
142.
at 2005 WLNR 16256877.
143.
Corr, supra note 139.
Bill McConnell, China Watchdog Warns of M&A Tide, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 11,
144.
2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 18233536.
145.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, You Can't Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2006, at

20061

FROM FRETTING TAKEOVERS TO VETTING CF/US

1323

The most recent and substantive plans for change have come on
the heels of the Dubai Ports World affair. House Majority Whip Roy
Blunt, a Republican from Missouri, has announced that the
Republican party is in the process of drafting a bill that will require
Congressional oversight, though additional details are unclear at this
point. 146 A separate measure, being drafted by Congressman Richard
Shelby, a Republican from Alabama and the Chairman of the Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, goes one step
further and would empower Congress with the ability to "pass a
resolution of disapproval, even after the administration gives a deal
1 47
the green light."'
Congressional hearings in the summer of 2006 yielded "rival"
bills in the House and the Senate, both of which were "inspired by the
Dubai Ports controversy." 148 The House bill requires "giving more
information to Congress," increasing disclosure, removing some of the
secrecy, but also sacrificing the confidentiality that is valuable to
investors. 149 The Senate bill, meanwhile, takes a much firmer stance,
proposing to put in place regulations if a deal will cause "any possible
impairment to national security ... or have a debilitating impact on
national economic security.' 150 Exactly how the implementation of
these pieces of legislation will eventually play out is yet to be seen,
but the concern that the United States' status as "the biggest net
winner from the free flow of global capital" is in jeopardy is certainly
being questioned by entities in the upper echelons of the U.S.
151
business and legal communities.
C. The Implications of the Seemingly Imminent Expansion of CFIUS
for Directorsand Shareholders
Both those who fear business interests taking precedence over
national security and those who extol the continuing virtues of
foreign investment in the United States appear to be in accord that
certain changes-if not a complete overhaul-need to be made to the
CFIUS process. 152 Thus, a higher level of CFIUS involvement in
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cross-border transactions involving U.S. targets seems likely, if not
inevitable. 15 3 The question naturally arises then as to what this will
entail for directors and shareholders of U.S. corporations-those who,
until now, held substantially all of the influence in allowing or
blocking these transactions.
Supposing CFIUS review was to become a mandatory part of
Delaware corporate law, shareholders would essentially lose some of
the value in their voting power. The Delaware merger statute is
unique in that it gives shareholders the opportunity to vote on (to
approve or disapprove) an action of the board of directors. 154
Ordinarily, shareholders have the ability to vote for the directors
serving the corporation, but do not have the power to override
directors' decisions. 155 If CFIUS were able to determine whether or
not it is appropriate for a U.S. corporation to enter into a transaction,
it would essentially be assuming the role of the corporation's
directors. 156 Far-reaching changes in the CFIUS process would
undoubtedly find their way into state corporation codes, or at least
require courts to determine, in yet another instance, how state law
and federal law are to interact with one another. Since Delaware
courts have traditionally shown a great deal of deference toward
directors via doctrines such as the business judgment rule (deferring
to the decisions of directors in business matters), this change would
mark a radical departure from much of the well-settled Delaware
case law. 15 7 Again, the shareholders would be shortchanged in that
their primary power, the ability to vote for those who make the
company's business decisions (ordinarily the directors) would be
taken away. From the vantage point of potential investors in a
company, the decision to invest in the company is necessarily an
uninformed one, for they arguably do not know who will be making
the company's business decisions-an incredibly significant piece of
information that would surely factor into any rational investor's
decision.
Depending on the rigor with which a revamped CFIUS would
examine proposed transactions, the implications for potential
investors could plausibly render them increasingly wary of investing
in the firms in the first place-an indisputably deleterious outcome in
terms of the domestic economy. Indeed, returning momentarily to the
UnocalCNOOC paradigm, the Unocal shareholders were arguably
the ultimate losers because they were deprived of the opportunity to

153.
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accept the highest bid offered. 158 Significantly, if the CNOOC bid
were not withdrawn, and the Unocal directors had nonetheless
selected the Chevron bid, there would likely have arisen the issue of
159
whether the Unocal directors had fulfilled their fiduciary duty.
Because the company was for sale, the directors had a duty to
maximize shareholder value and they would probably not have done
so had they opted for the Chevron bid in the face of the CNOOC bid,
which was more lucrative for their shareholders. 160 In a world where
this well-established doctrine were not in place (as a result of a
potential acquirer backing away from an otherwise sound transaction
due to protectionist concerns), shareholders would end up
shortchanged and arguably less likely to put themselves in such a
position (that of the passive investor) in the future.
If we place any value on our unique system of corporate
governance in regard to merger activity-whereby private ordering is
favored and a trust of market forces is preached to generate the most
economically sound outcome--it would be in our best interest to
ensure that the CFIUS reforms which are effected strike a balance
between national security interests and economic/financial interests.
National security has become increasingly important since U.S.
vulnerability to foreign attack was exposed on September 11, 2001.
At the same time, the flow of capital in response to market demand
that our corporate law allows produces well-documented benefits to
employment and productivity. 161 Arguably, we would not want to
allow either of these concerns to slip away in the quest to overhaul
the process by which the government becomes involved in foreign
acquisitions of domestic assets.
Given the U.S. position as the "cornerstone of the global
investment atmosphere" and the fact that U.S. policy has "influenced
the course and defined the shape of laws and policies governing the
acceptance of foreign capital worldwide," the importance of these
decisions cannot be stressed enough. 16 2 Indeed, the policy adopted in
Washington will likely have an effect, not only on foreign investment
in the United States, but also on the ability of U.S. companies to
invest abroad-assuming that similar regulations will subsequently
16 3
be adopted by major U.S. trade and business partners.
Perhaps William Reinsch's comments best sum up the point of
view that this type of regulation is inappropriate: "A year from now
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we will all be embarrassed by this." 16 4 Those subscribing to this
school of thought wish to preserve the openness to foreign investment
in the United States. 165 On the other hand, the "protectionist
bandwagon" in Congress is countering that desperate times call for
desperate measures and sees no harm in addressing newly relevant
concerns about the existing process. 166 The remainder of this Note
aims to propose a formulation of the CFIUS process that will strike a
balance between the twin aims articulated in the congressional
hearings subsequent to the failed Unocal/CNOOC transaction.

IV. A PROPOSED REFORM To U.S. MERGER LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF
CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS

A. Various Economic, Political,and Social Goals Should Not Be
Compromised
It should be reiterated that the CFIUS process only requires
additional scrutiny for 10% of the transactions that are submitted for
review. 167 The other 90% of cross-border transactions submitted to
CFIUS undergo a routine review that is completed in less than thirty
days, either because "they do not raise significant national security
issues" or "the parties have worked with the government to mitigate
national security concerns." 168 Therefore, proposals for reform can
focus on this subset of transactions, which implicate the types of
national security issues about which U.S. politicians and
businessmen have become concerned.
Further, any reform to the process for this subset of cases must
continue to cater to both sides of the current debate by continuing to
promote the open investment policy on home soil-historically a
defining feature of the U.S. economy-but also ensuring that national
security considerations do not take a back seat to the maintenance of
this policy. 169 In reforming the current system, a continued trust of
private ordering in U.S. corporate law would undoubtedly prove
beneficial to the health of the economy. At the same time, this
reliance on private ordering should not go so far as to compromise the
irrefutable need for enhanced national security in the post-9/11 era.
With these goals in mind, one can begin to construct a revised process
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for evaluating the viability of cross-border transactions involving
foreign entities acquiring U.S. assets.
B. Revising CFIUS
The focus of the actual CFIUS review process has probably been
the subject of debate the most among Washington policymakers in
the months since the failed Unocal/CNOOC transaction. 170 Indeed,
regardless of which side of the issue a particular individual is on, all
interested parties would agree that a clarification of the actual review
process would be beneficial.
Firstly, the voluntary aspect of the CFIUS process must be
abolished if the agency is to make any steps toward becoming a more
legitimate and effectual force in U.S. merger law.
With this
abolishment of the voluntary nature of CFIUS review comes an
inevitable loss in efficiency, but the revamped process, as described
below, will be as streamlined as possible, so as to avoid unnecessary
inefficiencies in administration of the review.
The two categories subject to CFIUS analysis should be as
follows: 1) issues of national security and 2) issues of economic
prosperity. At the outset, it should be noted that the line between
these two is not clear-cut, and there will inevitably be overlap
between the categories.
However, creating the categories will
nonetheless add structure to the CFIUS review process, forcing the
Committee to address both components in every case.
As to national security, CFIUS has apparently been using a
relatively narrow definition, as evidenced by the lack of transactions
actually prevented by the Committee. 171 A broadening of this
definition is undoubtedly necessary in the wake of increased security
concerns in recent years.
Questions of economic security have
traditionally been dealt with by CFIUS in a typically murky fashion,
and it is frankly unclear what criteria are presently being used by the
172
Committee.
A first step would be the formulation of statutory definitions of
both "national security" and "economic prosperity," neither of which
exists in the current version of the Exon-Florio Amendments. 173
Ideally, these definitions should be formulated with the assistance of
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the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the
Treasury. A concrete, carefully worded definition would undoubtedly
be more effective than the list of factors to be considered currently in
the statute. The following proposed definitions would perhaps best
serve as a starting point for the individuals and entities that will
eventually be responsible for drafting the text of the revised statute:
"National Security" - pertaining to matters of production needed for
national defense requirements, including human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies or services.
"Economic Prosperity"- relating to matters that the Department of the
Treasury [or other appropriate federal governmental body] would deem
appropriate and beneficial to the national trade deficit.

It should be noted that both of these definitions have the propensity
to either become overly broad or overly narrow, and there are
certainly factions in favor of both extremes. In providing these very
basic starting points, the definitions above attempt to tread a middle
ground. Inevitably, however, the definitions that ultimately find
their way into the actual statute will have a much stronger and more
evident tendency to sway toward either a broad or narrow rendering.
Once these definitions are in place, the next step in revising the
statute will be to decide precisely who will sit on the Committee and,
further, who will have involvement regardless of whether they sit on
the Committee. However the definition that eventually appears in
the revised statute may be worded, the individuals (and the various
agencies and groups behind them) who will be interpreting the
language of the statute are just as important, if not more so, than the
language itself. It has already been noted that the Treasury, in its
current role as Chair of the Committee, has taken a narrow view of
what constitutes a threat to national security.1 74 Therefore, it is of
utmost importance that each representative from a group with
incentives to construe the statute in a particular fashion be counterbalanced by a representative that has an incentive or propensity to
construe the statute in the countervailing fashion. This precept must
be kept in mind when it comes time to reconstruct the makeup of
CFIUS.

C. Revamping the CFIUS Process
When a transaction is reviewed under CFIUS, there are
obviously two immediate options: either the transaction will be
approved, or not. If it is approved, of course, the parties are free to
carry on negotiating the terms of the transaction and go forward with
the deal. If the CFIUS review results in less than satisfactory
findings, however, this reform proposal suggests that the parties be
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given an opportunity to amend the terms of the transaction before the
issue goes to Congress.
Allowing the parties to step in and renegotiate key terms at this
point will maintain the trust of private ordering aspect of U.S. merger
law. 175 The parties will have a chance to make adjustments to the
terms of their transaction in the hope that they can alleviate the
national security or economic concerns raised during the CFIUS
review process.
Returning to the Unocal/CNOOC paradigm scenario, a need for
this type of mechanism is evidenced by the letter transmitted from
CNOOC CEO Fu Chengyu to the U.S. Congress amidst the opposition
to CNOOC's bid. 176 As previously referenced, Mr. Chengyu made
several assurances to the U.S. Congress in that letter that Congress's
concerns regarding national security and a loss of employment for
U.S. workers were unfounded and went on to list several reasons
supporting these assurances. 177 Had the parties been given the
opportunity to discuss the specifics of the terms themselves, and put
the results of their negotiations into the proposed merger agreement,
it is likely that members of Congress who opposed the transaction
going forward would have been left with a considerably diminished
platform on which to stand. Again, the parties would have been able
to rely on private ordering to come to an agreement that suited both
parties. Further, involvement by Congress would not have been a
factor because the parties themselves would have been given a chance
to address the concerns raised in the CFIUS process. Although it is
nearly impossible in this era to separate matters of business and
matters of politics, this system would prevent a business transaction
from becoming an explicitly political matter-which the world
witnessed during the failed Unocal/CNOOC transaction.
In the interest of efficiency, the time that the parties are given to
renegotiate the terms of their transaction should be limited to either
a thirty-day or sixty-day window. This would prevent the interested
parties from dragging their feet and keep the process moving
smoothly towards resolution.
The determination of the precise
window of time should be made based on the level and severity of the
CFIUS issues that arise. Perhaps a thirty-day window, with the
possibility that the parties can apply for a thirty-day extension
pending CFIUS approval, would be the most sensible approach.
CFIUS approval of the extension would be based on the Committee's
own assessment of the severity and complexity of its objections to the
proposed transaction.
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Once the opportunity to amend the terms of the transaction has
been given to the parties, then they could resubmit the revised plan of
merger to CFIUS for a secondary review. Again, if CFIUS approves
the terms of the transaction (arguably the ideal outcome if this
system is to function as intended), the transaction can go forward as
the parties have delineated in the merger agreement. If, however,
CFIUS still has objections to the transaction on any substantive
grounds, the review process should continue at this point in the same
fashion as it has historically. Though this process is lengthy and thus
may contravene the efficiency goal to some extent, it would be used
only after the parties had been given the opportunity to avoid it
within a relatively controlled time frame.
Admittedly, this type of process would result in companies being
required to give at least as much attention to international trade and
security policies in structuring transactions as they do to more
traditional areas of concern such as tax, pension, and environmental
policies. 178 Among the variables that can and should be considered
are: "expected participation in the transaction by non-U.S. parties;
connections between parties and compliance-sensitive activities, such
as whether a party is a defense contractor, technology company, oil
company, or financial company; connections between parties and
compliance-sensitive areas of the world, such as the Middle East,
Central or Southeast Asia, or Africa; and a party's heavy reliance on
export markets. '179 It is most efficient to shift much of this burden
onto the parties themselves, rather than allowing them to become
overly reliant on the government's newly-implemented mechanisms
for resolving these issues.18 0 If the parties take the time to negotiate
the merger terms, even where they did not find that necessary in the
past, and conduct "particularly intensive due diligence," the burden
on the government will be less, and the cross-border merger process
8
will sacrifice as little as possible in terms of efficiency.'
D. Proposed Change to Delaware Merger Statute
A final, and relatively minor, change that should be made is
creating some statutory record at the state level of the new process
described above. Even though the changes to CFIUS are exclusively
federal in nature, it is sensible to include a provision in the Delaware
General Corporate Law (and, of course, a corresponding provision in
the body of corporate law governing other states as well) making clear
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to the appropriate entities that additional procedures are required
when the Delaware company is the target of a foreign acquisition.
The addition of this provision would be as simple as adding a
subsection (h) to § 251 of the Delaware General Corporate Law. The
provision could be worded as follows:
(h) In the event that an entity incorporated in this jurisdiction is being
acquired by an entity incorporated under laws other than those of the
United States, the parties must comply with the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States' review process as delineated in [insert
citation to relevant federal statute].

Such a provision would make it abundantly clear that the CFIUS
process is mandatory when a Delaware entity finds itself in this
situation, with the hope that this compulsory provision would relay
the significance of the provision to foreign entities as well. In this
fashion, the notion that CFIUS is merely a "doormat" for foreign
18 2
acquirers will quickly be corrected.
It should be noted that a more detailed provision is certainly a
viable option, but other references to foreign issuers, for instance, in
the Delaware General Corporate Law are generally brief and provide
cross-references to the relevant bodies of law.1 83 As such, it seems
most sensible to treat this new provision in the same fashion, rather
than launching into a detailed description of the CFIUS process
within the Delaware statute itself.

V.

CONCLUSION

As the nation's attention turns, with increased frequency and
intensity, towards reforming merger law in the United States
regarding cross-border transactions, an understanding of the
problems facing the current mechanism in place is essential. As such,
this Note has first and foremost attempted to lay out the current
problem and the most prominent situations in which the issue has
arisen in recent years. Secondly, the guidelines for overhaul of the
CFIUS process are informed by a thorough understanding of the
needs of the areas in which the current process is
lacking-namely
that it has not been created with an appreciation for heightened
security risks and changing standards of economic prosperity given
the U.S. trade deficit.
One critique that will undoubtedly be leveled at the factors
mentioned above as guidelines for revising the CFIUS process-and
thereby substantially changing the face of U.S. merger law with
respect to cross-border acquisitions of U.S. assets by foreign entities-
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is that such change of longstanding principles of U.S. merger law and,
indeed, U.S. foreign policy as it relates to corporate law (respect for
private ordering, openness to foreign investment, etc.) will not be
easy to effect.
Concededly, this type of change would require
cooperation and endorsement from a number of parties in different
sectors of our business and political communities-from politicians in
Washington, to corporate executives at home and abroad. Indeed,
these are individuals who operate in very different spheres of society,
but efforts must begin soon to inform these parties of the need to
intensify scrutiny of these transactions for national security reasons,
while still eschewing protectionism and maintaining the openness to
foreign investment that has played an integral role in U.S. economic
and social growth since its founding. There is no doubt that this is a
fine line to walk, but the appropriate foresight at this relatively early
juncture, combined with the cooperation and understanding of all
necessary parties, a compromise can surely be reached that will
reflect these new needs but not stray too far in the direction of either
extreme.
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